Director of the Swiss Institute of International Economics and Applied Economic
Research.
Gebhard was a very active member of the EPCS, not only as its president from 2003 to 2005 but also according to his research. In the 1970s and 1980s, he worked on political business cycles and popularity functions. His dissertation (Kirchgässner 1976 ) and habilitation (Kirchgässner 1984a ) were on these subjects, but he published extensively on it during his whole academic career (e.g., Kirchgässner 1983a Kirchgässner , 1984b Kirchgässner , 1985a Kirchgässner , 1985b Kirchgässner , 1991a . Actually, Gebhard never lost interest in voting and government popularity as central themes to Public Choice Kirchgässner 2000a, Kirchgässner 2009 ). According to his results, unemployment, sometimes even hidden unemployment, sometimes inflation, consistently influenced the popularity of German governments. There is only one exception: For the Schröder government, Gebhard could not establish a robust effect (Kirchgässner 2009 ). One of the last papers he could finish is a survey on voting and popularity (Kirchgässner 2016a ).
His interests in voting and rational choice broadened since the 1980s by studying the paradox of voting. The difference between actual election turnout and the one predicted by rational choice models is still a challenge to Public Choice. Gebhard Kirchgässner contributed to this literature by analyzing to what extent closeness of an election matters for marginal turnout Schimmelpfennig 1992, Kirchgässner and Meyer zu Himmern 1997) .
In competition with Brennan and Lomasky's (1993) expressive voting theory, developed a theory of low cost decisions. In contrast to instrumental voting, which holds that voters elect parties or candidates in order to obtain political outcomes close to their self-interests, expressive voting theory argues that voters only express their sympathy or discontent, like cheering for a sports team.
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Expressive voting behavior appears to be easier to manipulate than instrumental voting and it is morally agnostic. In Kirchgässner's low cost decision theory, moral behavior has a better chance to become dominant. There are two types of low cost decisions: those in which a person makes a decision that has no effect on him-/herself but a large effect on other individuals. Judges usually face this situation. And there are those decisions in which an individual decides without effect on his/her welfare but on the general collective good, like in elections. Kirchgässner argues that in such situations individuals have low costs to behave morally. If individuals adopt moral norms during their socialization process or if peer groups enforce certain moral norms, the low-cost decision is shaped by soft incentives. extends this argument to a theory of minimal morals.
When probabilistic voting models became more popular in Public Choice and Political Economics in the 1990s and 2000s, Gebhard appeared to be unconvinced that they really provide a solution for the classical voting cycle problem in social choice. Kirchgässner (2000) proves that similar restrictions to policy space are necessary to avoid cycles and manipulation by agenda setters as in the classical case of the impossibility theorem.
Gebhard Kirchgässner studied differences in policy outcomes induced by different constitutional frameworks in the sense that is popular today as Comparative Political Economics. His works on tax competition, fiscal federalism and decentralization may be located in traditional public economics or Public Choice (Kirchgässner and Pommerehne 1976 , Kirchgässner and Pommerehne 1996 , Feld and Kirchgässner 2003 . Indeed, Brennan and Buchanan's (1980) Leviathan model is at least lurking in the background of these analyses (see Feld, Kirchgässner and Schaltegger 2010) . His papers on the effects of direct democracy clearly follow a comparative perspective. 4 Feld and Kirchgässner (1999 , 2001a , 2001b and Feld, Kirchgässner and Schaltegger (2011) analyze the impact of fiscal referendums on public spending, revenue, deficits or debt. Feld, Fischer and Kirchgässner (2010) have a closer look as to how referendums and popular initiatives affect the welfare state. Dorn at al. (2008) study happiness and direct democracy. In addition, Gebhard followed direct democracy research in several surveys from the Kirchgässner, Feld and Savioz (1999) book and the Feld and Kirchgässner (2000b) survey to one of his most recent papers (Kirchgässner 2016b ). This comparative research also aligns with studies on the effect of fiscal institutions on fiscal policy outcomes (Feld and Kirchgässner 2008 , Kirchgässner 2013a , 2014a , 2017a . (Kirchgässner 1991b , is one of his most cited works. He continued to work in this field until recently (Kirchgässner 2013b) . In these publications, Gebhard demonstrates the usefulness and boundaries of the economic model of behavior.
Moreover, Gebhard Kirchgässner was an econometrician finishing his other (earlier) habilitation in econometrics (Kirchgässner 1981) . Although his research covered the whole range of (applied) econometrics, his main passion was time series econometrics (Kirchgässner and Wolters 1992 , Kirchgässner 1993 , Kirchgässner and Müller 2006 , on which he published a textbook together with Jürgen Wolters (Kirchgässner and Wolters 2007) .
Finally, Gebhard Kirchgässner contributed to a large number of topics from economic policy and public economics to which I can only selectively refer. Some of his most successful publications are in monetary economics Wolters 1987, 1995) , but he also contributed to fiscal policy topics Pommerehne 1997, Kirchgässner and Prohl 2008) , environmental and energy economics Schneider 2003, Kirchgässner and Kübler 1992) and the shadow economy (Kirchgässner 1983b (Kirchgässner , 2017b . Gebhard Kirchgässner did not only have broad research interests, he remained devoted to these interests. Above all, however, he was devoted to rigorous scientific standards. He remained incorruptible and principled in scientific analysis throughout his career. He particularly disliked pompous incompetence. His comments were dreaded, in particular when he started saying that the analysis was plain wrong. He was not only dedicated to research, but also a true and reliable friend.
Gebhard Kirchgässner passed on April 1, 2017, just two weeks before his 69 th birthday, after a long and severe disease. In great dignity, he accepted his fate of leaving earlier than expected. Economics, in particular Public Choice, lost a towering figure, an influential scholar and a great mind. We miss him already.
